The following was written as part of a response to the problem of evil as presented in an article given to me. The article referenced is J.L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence.”

Before I respond to the problem of evil, I’d like to account for the persuasive nature of the argument and describe the context within which I find it to be effective. In constructing a valid syllogism, one must add at least an additional premise, as J.L. Mackie concedes in his article “Evil and Omnipotence.” In Mackie’s words, this premise is that “good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.” Often, and probably intuitively, humanity considers this dichotomy to correspond roughly to some measure of human well-being and/or a lack of suffering. Given this anthropocentric understanding of good, that premise is reasonable in that a good being would seek to promote human well-being. Thus, for general theists or any who hold merely to Classical Theism and endorse a humanistic conception of goodness, the problem of evil seems to indeed be problematic. The same would be true for Christians who hold a similarly man-centered approach to ethics. 

So it is apparent that the argument depends on a certain understanding of goodness, which is whichever characteristic determines that its possessor will destroy evil to the extent to which it’s able. Likewise, it depends on specific definitions of omnipotence and omniscience. Mackie concludes that popular free will theodicies undermine omnipotence as it has commonly been understood. That may be so, but that is not an issue for those who readily admit a varied understanding. Reformed Epistemologist Alvin Plantinga, for example, has posited a free will theodicy which I consider to be valid (though unsound). However, Plantinga does concede a certain inability on God’s part to act illogically. He would still uphold what most consider an orthodox doctrine of omnipotence, but it is certainly distinct from how Mackie applies omnipotence to the problem of evil. The contemporary questions surrounding a proper definition of omnipotence do not generally deal with reducing God’s authority (at least in any directly relevant sense), such as in the case of Gnostics who view God as an inferior demiurge capable of creating, but rather with nuances. These might include qualifications such as whether or not God is able to act illogically or immorally. Additionally, the nuance would deal with the nature of the limits imposed on God; are they limits in power, or limits due to God’s conceived nature? What exactly is communicated by the idea of “power” in a discussion of God? For many Christians, these nuances are not entirely novel and do not constitute any significant departure from historical orthodoxy. Yet, this aspect of the argument would still hold true for strict Classical Theists in many cases. As with goodness and omnipotence, omniscience too brings on a fair amount of discussion. Proponents of views such as Open Theism uphold what they and many others would consider to be a form of omniscience while still disagreeing substantially with the orthodox concept. 

The problem of evil is only, therefore, relevant to those who adhere to the assumed ideas of omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. Now, Mackie or others are able to suggest that these terms are not usefully applicable to these varying ideas. In fact, I would agree with that, at least as far as omniscience and omnipotence go. However, if the important questions of semantics are brought into the syllogism, it seems the problem of evil loses a lot of strength. A significant portion of its persuasive power is in the implicit “all or nothing” stance regarding God’s “omni” traits. Most Christians are incredibly hesitant, and rightly so in my eyes, to deny that God is omnipotent. The same is true of omniscience and goodness. However, many would be open to the nuances that have been discussed throughout history. So, it would be helpful for those presenting the problem of evil to define these traits as they are used. In summary, there are many valid theodicies which do not remain within Mackie’s understanding of the characteristics which at the same time are not large departures from popular understandings of God. 

Now that I have discussed where room for solutions to the problem exists, I would like to explain my understanding of God’s characteristics and how they relate. I will first offer my view as a defense against the problem of evil, but I will also attempt to make a positive defense of my view as being consistent. First, I will define the “omni” traits as I have come to understand them. With respect to omniscience, I very likely agree with Mackie’s usage of the word in all relevant senses. I hold that God has infallible knowledge of all facts and that this includes foreknowledge in virtue of having preordained the future. 

With regard to omnipotence, I tend to side with Plantinga in viewing God as constrained to logical possibility. I consider it to be a limit derived from His nature, saying little about God’s “power.” The question that follows is whether or not God can choose to act contrary to His nature, or whether or not God can alter His nature. I consider this a misunderstanding of the idea of a nature. When I speak of nature, be it human or divine, I am speaking not in a loose sense of what something normally does, but in a strict sense of how something is, of that which determines one’s choices. So I hold God’s nature to be the basis of His decisions. So God cannot act contrary to His nature, in my view, as it is His nature which determines His actions. Mackie would certainly consider this a limit on omnipotence, and to an extent I agree. I don’t find omnipotence to be a helpful descriptor of the biblical God, or even one which Scripture supports. I believe a biblical definition of an omnipotent being and one useful for critiquing and understanding my view of God is this: a being whose intentions will come to pass solely in virtue of the intender. This would exclude all logical impossibilities, as God would not will something contrary to His logical nature. So, were I an adherent to a form of free will theology, I would argue a free will theodicy in spite of Mackie’s claims. I also believe that my understanding of these limits on God’s capability evades Mackie’s challenges regarding omnipotence paradoxes. I am also a theological determinist who simultaneously holds that God does not subsist continuously/omnitemporally but rather atemporally, so Mackie’s argument fails to apply to me at that point as well. However, because I am a determinist, the omnipotence aspect is not as relevant to my defense against the problem as my understanding of God’s goodness. 

In direct contrast to the popular anthropocentric view of goodness, I hold a theocentric view. Specifically, I believe that goodness is defined by God’s nature and is ultimately oriented toward His glory. On this point alone, the problem of evil fails to be a problem for me; if God considers the existence of evil to contribute to His glory, He is good in spite of the existence of evil. Now, many would deny such a God worship. But at that point it is less of a logical problem of evil and more so an emotional problem of evil. One may respond that this is no longer goodness, but that both begs the question against my view and moves beyond the scope of the logical problem of evil, which is an internal critique which thus assumes the views of the worldview (or in this case the god) under criticism. From this point alone I find the problem of evil to be unproblematic for my worldview. However, I will explain how I believe good and evil exist in relation to each other at this point for the sake of demonstrating further consistency. I believe God ordains evil. I believe that the evil in our world is just that, evil, and it is so in virtue of being contrary to God’s commands. However, in a consequentialist sense, evil can be considered good as it relates to God’s sovereign plan. By this I mean that God has ordained evil for a holy end. This includes redeeming a fallen mankind, disciplining His children, demonstrating His sovereignty, wrath, and justice, and more. I do not merely believe that God simply permits evil and is excused for it. Rather, I believe that God is completely sovereign over evil, preordaining its role, and is actually doing a good and pure thing in ordaining evil to pass. Thus, evil far from impugns God’s moral stature. In fact, it exalts God and His sovereign holiness.

J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 254. (Apr., 1955), pp.
200-212.

Grace and Peace